Introduction
This chapter examines the responses of Japanese mass opinion to Tokyo's participation in the American-led "War on Terror." It focuses on the dispatch of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships to the Indian Ocean in the fall of 2001, their continued operations there, and the dispatch of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) to Iraq in 2003 Iraq in -2004 . Secondary foci include views of the threat posed by international terrorism and opinions about American foreign policy.
While addressing these issues, this chapter considers whether the war on terror and especially the events of 9/11 have changed, encouraged gradual evolution, or reinforced preexisting Japanese beliefs about the efficacy of using force. It finds that Japanese public opinion is gradually evolving away from rigid and ideological pacifism and toward a view best captured by the concept of "defensive realism." For the sake of placing Japanese public opinion in comparative perspective, this chapter analyzes comparable data on American and German public opinion. Germany appears to be a plausible defensive realist peer while American opinion shows greater faith in the utility of military force, suggesting closer proximity to what will be described as "offensive realism."
For data, this chapter utilizes publicly available media and governmentsponsored opinion polls. However, this chapter suffers from at least two methodological problems that challenge any researcher interested in Japanese public opinion. The first problem is what this writer calls "question instability." Although Japanese opinion does at times appear to shift wildly, and is often dismissed as changeable and fickle, more often than not these changes reflect too frequent variations in question wording and sources. These changes not only make opinion look more unstable than it really is, but also complicate any attempt to accumulate multiple data points into a single table or graph. Second, Japanese polling agencies are notoriously unwilling to make raw data sets (cross-tabs, etc.) publicly available, preferring to limit released data to top-line results, and occasionally scattered cross-tab results. Nevertheless, this chapter does make use of several data sets released by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun to the Japan Data Archive at the Roper Center and obtained by the author.
The remainder of this chapter consists of three sections. The following section identifies several major currents in Japanese mass opinion regarding the use of force and relates them to broader theories about the utility of military force. The third section presents detailed hypotheses regarding perceptions about the utility of military force and a wealth of polling data supporting these hypotheses. The final section considers the policy implications of the gradual shift in Japanese mass opinion away from pacifist beliefs and toward those of defensive realism.
Anti-Militarism, Defensive Realism, and Offensive Realism
Although this chapter uses the term "pacifism," at its base, Japanese beliefs about the military and military force originate less from a pacifist worldview than from what has been called a "culture of antimilitarism." 1 Because of a widespread belief that the Japanese military hijacked the Japanese state in the 1930s and led it into a devastating and irrational war, distrust of the military and the Japanese state's ability to assert civilian control and wisely wield the sword has been deep-seated. A spokesperson of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), speaking against Japan's plan to begin sending the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas in 1992 to participate in UN peacekeeping, summarized this view when she claimed, "once the SDF is allowed to go abroad, there will be no limits as to what it will do, as the experience of the Pacific War has shown." 2 Around this core of distrust in the Japanese military grew several broader attitudes.
3 First, there was the belief that all wars are equally unjustified and counterproductive; offensive and defensive wars cannot therefore be distinguished. Second, some desired to see Japan pursue, as the Socialist Party once advocated, unarmed neutrality. Third, a lightly armed Japan was believed the best way to discourage others from targeting or attacking Japan, as it would then pose no threat to them. This view is perhaps best captured in the phrase of Takemura Masayoshi, a leading centrist politician of the mid-1990s, who advocated "a small but bright and shining Japan (chisakutomo kirari to hikaru koku nihon)" that would avoid provoking others to target it.
